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Past experiences and expectations about the future 
shape how people think about work and welfare. Given 
the uncertainty many young people face when entering 
the labor market, we investigate whether 1) young peo­
ples’ experiences of social mobility and 2) their future 
mobility expectations impact their attitudes regarding 
the meaning of work and welfare. Drawing on the con­
cepts of self­interest and deservingness, we examine 
how both the experiences and expectations of intergen­
erational social mobility influence the ways in which 
young adults view the so­called moral dimension of 
work and welfare. results of logistic regression analyses 
of around 11,000 young adults in eleven countries sug­
gest that the relationship between mobility and indi­
viduals’ views on work and welfare varies depending on 
the dimension of mobility (economic and social origins, 
for example), with expected future mobility exerting a 
stronger effect on attitudes than past mobility experi­
ences. We find that self­interest, not empathy with 
one’s social origins, appears to be the primary driver of 
these attitudes.
Keywords: social mobility; welfare attitudes; mobility 
effects; self­interest; deservingness
Work and welfare attitudes have many antecedents, including the crucial role 
that one’s economic position and social origin 
plays in shaping opinions and preferences. the 
experiences people have throughout their life­
times, and particularly in their younger years, 
shape how they view the meaning of work. 
today we face a situation in which intergenera­
tional upward mobility (i.e., achieving a higher 
socioeconomic status than one’s parents) is no 
longer a given for many young people: eco­
nomic circumstances remain challenging after 
the economic crisis, and an increase in univer­
sity graduates has led to fierce competition on 
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the job market (eurofound 2017). In light of this situation, characterized by both 
real and threatened downward mobility, we are interested in how the experiences 
and expectations of social mobility, both upward and downward, impact young 
people’s attitudes toward work and welfare.
Our work here addresses the following research questions: 1) How does inter­
generational social mobility (upward/downward) impact young people’s attitudes 
regarding the meaning of work? 2) Do future mobility expectations matter for 
young people’s normative attitudes regarding work and welfare? By adopting a 
differentiated approach to the study of social mobility and its consequences, we 
offer new insights into the formation of work and welfare attitudes. While there 
are broad literatures covering both how social position as well as the prospects of 
moving up or down the socioeconomic ladder impact redistributive preferences, 
we know much less about how social mobility can shape the so­called moral 
aspects of welfare states. these moral or normative dimensions go beyond pure 
redistributive preferences and rather tap into beliefs about deservingness (Mau 
2003) and the normative conceptions of work. A multidimensional conceptualiza­
tion of welfare state support enables us to consider sources of support beyond 
material self­interest, such as normative concerns and preferences (roosma, 
Gelissen, and van Oorschot 2013; Sihvo and uusitalo 1995; van Oorschot 2010). 
Such a conceptualization furthermore allows for the possibility that individuals 
may hold a differentiated set of views. By focusing on the so­called moral dimen­
sion of the work­welfare nexus, in particular the receipt of welfare benefits and 
the influence on work values, we investigate the effects of intergenerational 
mobility beyond preferences for redistribution. More specifically, we provide 
empirical insights into how both the lived experiences and future expectations of 
intergenerational mobility shape young adults’ attitudes about welfare and 
employment. When citizens do not feel recipients of social support are deserving 
of assistance, they will be unlikely to extend support for the maintenance or 
expansion of such programs and policies. In other words, social solidarity, the 
willingness to share social risks, and beliefs about whom should benefit from col­
lective resources can have far­reaching consequences for elections, social poli­
cies, and even democratic legitimacy (rothstein 1998; van Oorschot 2013). Our 
measures of intergenerational social mobility focus on financial status and mobil­
ity expectations in terms of standard of living. In comparison to conventional 
measures like occupation or education, we consider these subjective measures to 
have important advantages for studying young adults in contemporary europe. 
Given the economic situation at the time the survey was fielded, with youth 
unemployment rates at nearly 50 percent in some european countries and many 
still struggling in the aftermath of the economic crisis, focusing on these 
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subjective dimensions of intergenerational mobility allows us to also include 
young adults who are currently not employed and would therefore be hard to 
classify in any analysis of occupational status mobility. finally, we illuminate 
mobility effects in countries where formal education may no longer be associated 
with the returns it once promised, such as in Spain or Greece.
Social Mobility and Normative Attitudes  
toward Work and Welfare
the extant literature on attitudes toward the welfare state has little to say about 
how social mobility shapes opinions regarding normative aspects of the welfare 
state and its beneficiaries. for our analysis, we formulate two sets of competing 
hypotheses based on two strands of literature—one that examines the effects of 
mobility on redistributive preferences and another that looks more specifically at 
welfare attitudes. Specifically, we focus on how self­interest and socialization 
experiences may mediate the relationship between social mobility and welfare 
attitudes.
The role of self-interest
the literature on welfare attitudes and redistributional preferences has grown 
rapidly over the last decade (Guillaud 2013; Jaeger 2005; rehm 2009), with 
 economic self­interest forming the basis of most studies. the origins of redis­
tributive preferences are often traced back to income and material self­interest, 
with the rich seeking to minimize their tax burden and the poor hoping to benefit 
from redistribution. this explanation has found a great deal of traction within the 
political economy literature (Meltzer and richard 1981; romer 1975), though it 
is not without its critics. Accordingly, potential beneficiaries of redistribution, i.e., 
people with below­average incomes, are anticipated to favor redistributive meas­
ures (and therefore higher rates of income taxation), whereas those with higher 
incomes—the potential contributors and bearers of the burden of income taxa­
tion—will oppose redistribution. More generally, the association between mate­
rial self­interest and redistributional preferences is expected to hold not only for 
current income, but also for other indicators of socioeconomic position, such as 
social class or educational level (Armingeon 2006).
Whereas the predictive power of an individual’s socioeconomic position has 
been widely documented, it does not fully account for the role of one’s past socio­
economic position, which might equally influence preferences and attitudes 
(Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Sihvo and uusitalo 1995). to some extent, upward 
or downward mobility entails processes of re­socialization. Although the family 
setting is an important environment for the formation of opinions and values, as 
children mature and encounter new economic circumstances, they may adjust 
their preferences and ideas about work and welfare according to their new socio­
economic situation (Abramson and Books 1971; Lown 2015; Piketty 1995).
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Intergenerational mobility may lead to a “self­serving perception of the role 
that ascribed and attained factors play in determining success or failure” 
(Gugushvili 2016b, 405). these so­called internal vs. external attributions of suc­
cess, in turn, influence people’s perceptions of existing inequalities and the role 
of the state (Gugushvili 2016a; Piketty 1995). this self­serving bias in causal 
attribution is expected to lead those who experienced intergenerational upward 
mobility to be more likely to attribute their success to their own efforts, and, 
therefore, to be less supportive of the welfare state and people who rely on its 
benefits (Gaviria, Graham, and Braido 2007; ravallion and Lokshin 2000). 
Similarly, people who experienced downward mobility may be more likely to 
attribute their situations to external sources, which may be associated with a 
greater welfare support and less negative views of people who receive support. 
As outlined in the section to follow, whether people see others as responsible for 
their failures shapes attitudes regarding deservingness and how they view social 
programs and their beneficiaries. these assumptions lead to the following 
hypotheses:
H1a: Intergenerational downward mobility increases the likelihood of holding 
positive views of receiving social support.
H1b: Intergenerational upward mobility decreases the likelihood of holding 
positive views of receiving social support.
In addition to past and current socioeconomic position, expectations about the 
future can also be expected to shape welfare state support. As illustrated by 
Benabou and Ok (2001) in their prospect of upward mobility hypothesis, expecta­
tions of upward mobility may lead rational actors to oppose redistribution, even 
if their current income would predict otherwise (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). 
this desire to insure against potential future losses has the potential to impact 
current welfare attitudes (Moene and Wallerstein 2001), as people with a 
stronger interest in social protection will be more likely to hold positive views of 
welfare programs and their recipients (van Oorschot 2010). recent studies have 
found that the prospect of downward mobility, in particular, can drive support for 
redistributive measures (Buscha 2012; Lee 2016), suggesting a sensitivity to 
losses, which may in turn positively impact welfare support. Based on the discus­
sion regarding the impact of experienced mobility and adding the consideration 
of expected mobility, we arrive at our next set of hypotheses:
H2a: expected upward mobility decreases the likelihood of holding positive 
views of receiving social support.
H2b: expected downward mobility increases the likelihood of holding positive 
views of receiving social support.
Socialization experiences and the role of deservingness
While self­interest appears to be an important driver of welfare attitudes, 
it is arguably not the only one, particularly when taking seriously the 
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multidimensionality of welfare support (see also the contribution in this volume 
by Gallie on the dimensions of work values). for example, why might someone 
at the top of the socioeconomic ladder nevertheless hold favorable attitudes 
toward welfare programs and their recipients? to answer this question, it is 
necessary to look for answers beyond pure material self­interest (Mau 2003; 
Sabbagh and Vanhuysse 2006). We therefore develop a counter hypothesis, 
which focuses on the concept of deservingness. Whom one considers to be 
deserving of public support has been shown to crucially shape attitudes of wel­
fare support for specific groups.
But what influences our evaluations of deservingness? Of the various deserv­
ingness criteria outlined by van Oorschot (2000), he finds control and identity to 
be the most important drivers of deservingness attitudes (cook 1979; Will 1993). 
regarding control, people tend to be supportive of benefits for individuals or 
groups that are perceived to be victims of circumstance. for example, both the 
elderly and the sick are commonly viewed as deserving groups, as both old age 
and poor health are regarded as life stages or situations beyond one’s own control 
(Jensen and Petersen 2017; Petersen 2012; van Oorschot 2000, 2006). the unem­
ployed, on the other hand, are seen as largely responsible for their own fate; in 
other words, unlike the elderly or the sick, they could have prevented their situ­
ation of need (Hobbins 2016). this negative image of unemployed individuals 
has been found to span both time and space, even in countries with generous, 
universalistic welfare systems such as Sweden (furåker and Blomsterberg 2003; 
van Oorschot 2006). Studies have found that, compared with other groups of 
welfare recipients, “the unemployed are seen as having less ‘character’, less self­
responsibility, less perseverance, and less trustworthiness” (van Oorschot 2006, 
25–26).
Identity also matters, for when people identify with recipients and do not 
think of them in an us vs. them constellation, they are more likely to consider 
them to be deserving of social assistance (van Oorschot 2000). Danckert (2017), 
moreover, finds that having unemployed friends or family can weaken in­group 
and out­group distinctions and thereby combat negative images of the unem­
ployed. these findings echo rueda’s (2018) finding that altruism can be identi­
fied as a reason why the well­off would support redistributive efforts: altruism is 
particularly relevant in cases where the recipients of benefits are seen to be simi­
lar to those financing them.
returning to the question of why someone whose socioeconomic position 
would otherwise predict more conservative attitudes toward the welfare state and 
its recipients, the experience of social mobility, along with ideas of deservingness, 
can help to provide an answer. While from a rational choice perspective both the 
lived experience of upward intergenerational mobility and the prospects of it 
would predict critical assessments of the normative functions of the welfare state, 
we should not neglect the formative experiences of growing up less well­off: 
“[P]ersonal experiences with the frustrations of economic hardship or poverty … 
provide a first­hand understanding of the challenges of being poor and shape 
beliefs regarding personal responsibility for circumstance” (Lown 2015, 6). these 
socialization experiences may positively shape how upwardly mobile people view 
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welfare recipients, even those who do not work, in terms of their deservingness. 
for one, upwardly mobile individuals, because of their experiences growing up 
with less, may identify more with the less well­off. Moreover, having been social­
ized in an economically deprived environment, upwardly mobile people may also 
be less likely to attribute blame to benefit recipients, including the unemployed, 
for their situation. Decades­long scholarship has furthermore documented the 
pivotal role of childhood and adolescent socialization experiences for political 
attitudes well into adulthood (campbell et al. 1960; Niemi, craig, and Mattei 
1991; Sears 1975; see also kalleberg and Marsden, this volume).
Scholars such as Piketty (1995) argue that, even though a child grew up in an 
economically disadvantaged environment, he or she will update his or her eco­
nomic and political attitudes in accordance with his or her destination status. 
there is, however, reason to believe that formative childhood and adolescent 
socializing experiences will continue to shape attitudes about work and welfare 
well into adulthood: the experience of having grown up poor may affect how 
upwardly mobile people think about social policies and the users of these bene­
fits. these experiences “should serve as a counterweight to the conservative 
effects of upward mobility” (Lown 2015, 9). People who experienced upward 
intergenerational mobility have (per definition) experienced being in a lower 
socioeconomic status. People whose families struggled financially while they 
were growing up may, despite having eventually succeeded in climbing the social 
ladder, have feelings of empathy for or identification with lower status groups and 
a sense of need for a strong welfare state (Danckert 2017). Such an argument 
could be applied to upwardly mobile young adults, wherein the children may 
identify with their parents’ social milieu, the one in which they also grew up. 
Accordingly, in light of the self­interest hypotheses, we formulate a modified and 
competing hypothesis on the effects of social mobility on normative attitudes 
toward work and welfare:
H3: upward intergenerational mobility, both experienced and expected, 
increases the likelihood of holding positive views of receiving social  support.
Data and Methods
Data and sample
We draw on survey data from the cuPeSSe (cultural Pathways to economic 
Self­Sufficiency and entrepreneurship) project. the cuPeSSe survey is a mul­
tidisciplinary, cross­sectional, mixed­mode survey of young adults and their par­
ents fielded in 2016 (tosun et al. 2018). After excluding those who indicated that 
they are primarily in education and listwise deletion of cases with missing values 
on one of our explanatory or control variables, the analytical sample comprises 
10,923 young europeans aged 18 to 35 from eleven european countries (Austria, 
czech republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, 
turkey, and the united kingdom).1
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Measures
Our dependent variables are based on respondents’ responses to the following 
two statements: “It’s humiliating to receive money without having to work.” and 
“If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to find work.” these two 
statements are part of a battery of items on work values and were selected pre­
cisely because they tap the moral dimension of the work­welfare nexus. Answer 
categories range from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (4), and were 
recoded into binary outcome variables differentiating “agreement” (0) from 
“disagreement” (1) for the purpose of the multivariate analyses.
Our central explanatory variable is intergenerational mobility, operationalized 
along two key dimensions: financial mobility and expected mobility. unlike ear­
lier studies of the effects of mobility, we use subjective indicators of intergenera­
tional mobility rather than relying on formal indicators such as education or 
occupational status. Given the high unemployment levels in some countries at 
the time the survey was fielded, we felt it important to also include unemployed 
young people. Moreover, financial status may currently be a more insightful 
marker of social position in countries where formal education is no longer associ­
ated with the returns it once promised.
Intergenerational financial mobility is based on respondents’ assessments of 
their current financial situation as compared with their family’s situation when 
growing up.2 More specifically, we measure financial mobility as the positive 
(upward mobility), negative (downward mobility), or nondeviation (stability) of 
the respondent’s current situation from one’s family’s situation when he or she 
was 14. this measurement is derived from the more general concept of economic 
self­sufficiency (Gowdy and Pearlmutter 1993) and taps into the degree of one’s 
perceived financial deprivation. Despite the relatively vague reference to “being 
able to afford extras” in the survey question, we consider this measure a more 
favorable indicator of one’s financial situation than alternative measurements 
such as earnings and income (that are oftentimes biased due to social desirability 
and recall problems if surveyed retrospectively).
expected intergenerational mobility is calculated based on responses to the 
question: “Thinking about how your standard of living will be like in the future, 
how does it compare to how your parents are doing today?” responses were 
recoded into three categories, indicating upward, downward, or stable expecta­
tions about the future. Standard of living is a commonly used dimension of social 
mobility that is closely tied to the well­being and welfare of individuals (DiPrete 
2002).
We control for gender, age, first or second generation migration history, 
main economic activity, own and parental educational attainment, Left­right 
political attitudes, religiosity, previous unemployment experience, and whether 
the respondent is dependent on income from unemployment or other social 
benefits.3 All models furthermore include country­fixed effects to account for 
variation that can be traced back to differences across the eleven countries in 
the sample. A full description of all variables can be found in the online 
appendix.
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Analytical approach
In a first step, we look at the distributions of intergenerational financial and 
expected mobility separately for all countries. We then use the pooled country 
sample and estimate logistic regression models with two different work­welfare 
support items as outcome variables.4 for both outcomes, we first estimate sepa­
rate models that include either financial or expected mobility before both effects 
are eventually included simultaneously in a third model.
results
Looking at the distributions of intergenerational mobility across countries in 
table 1, several between­country differences, but also differences between dif­
ferent dimensions of social mobility, are striking. Beginning with intergenera­
tional financial mobility, the group of immobiles, i.e., those whose financial status 
is similar to their parents’, constitutes the largest group in all countries except 
Greece and turkey. Young Greeks report extraordinarily high rates of financial 
downward mobility (63 percent), which is not surprising given Greece’s excep­
tionally poor economic situation at the time of the survey. turkish youths show 
by far the lowest rates of financial downward mobility (16 percent). Beyond these 
two outliers, downward mobility is generally more common than upward mobil­
ity. Only in the czech republic, Italy, and Spain are upward mobility shares 
slightly higher than or equal to the shares of downwardly mobile.
regarding young europeans’ expectations about their future standard of living 
compared with their parents’ standard of living today, we find that most young 
europeans are rather optimistic when looking toward the future. Most young 
europeans expect to be able to maintain or even exceed their parents’ current 
standard of living. However, this does not apply to the Southern european coun­
tries Greece, Italy, and Spain, where the fear of future downward mobility is 
rather widespread: more than one in four young people expect that they will be 
unable to maintain their parents’ current standard of living for themselves.
turning to the multivariate analyses, we first describe the logistic regression 
results for the outcome “If welfare benefits are too high, there is no incentive to 
work” and then move on to results for the second outcome “It’s humiliating to 
receive money without having to work.” (see models 1–6 in table 2). Both out­
comes are phrased in such a way that disagreement indicates positive views of 
receiving social support and agreement indicates negative views of receiving 
social support. Given that disagreement is coded as 1, and agreement is coded as 
0, positive coefficients represent positive views and negative coefficients repre­
sent negative views of receiving social support.
Model 1 estimates effects of intergenerational financial mobility on the moral 
dimension of the work­welfare nexus (outcome 1: “If welfare benefits are too 
high, there is no incentive to work”). In line with the first two hypotheses (H1a 
and H1b), we find that financially downward mobile people are more likely, and 
financially upward mobiles are less likely, to hold positive views of receiving social 
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support than the immobiles. the latter effect is, however, not statistically signifi­
cant. the findings thus support the assumption that those who succeeded in 
climbing the social ladder tend to attribute their success to their own effort and 
therefore show less support for the welfare state. those who failed to maintain 
parental status presumably attribute this failure externally, and therefore show 
stronger support for the welfare state.
Model 2, also focusing on outcome 1, includes effects for mobility expecta­
tions, but not past mobility experience, and shows statistically significant negative 
effects for upward mobility expectations and statistically significant positive 
effects for downward mobility expectations. these findings are in line with the 
self­interest argument underlying the second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b), 
claiming that fears of downward mobility, i.e., being a potential future beneficiary 
of welfare benefits, makes people more inclined to hold positive views of receiv­
ing welfare benefits. Likewise, expecting to become a potential contributor in the 
future apparently makes people less supportive of the welfare state.
Predicted probabilities for both financial and expected mobility are illustrated 
in figure 1. As the figure shows, the likelihood of disagreeing with the statement 
is lower for both expected and experienced upward mobility as compared with 
the immobile group. Likewise, people who expect or who have experienced 
downward mobility are more likely to disagree with the statement than the 
immobile group. the darker lines, representing the effects of expected mobility, 
illustrate the more pronounced effects of mobility expectations, as none of the 
confidence intervals (95 percent) overlap, whereas, while we see a clear distinc­
tion between the group of downwardly mobiles vs. stable and upwardly mobile, 
the effects of immobility and upward mobility on this work­welfare attitude are 
tABLe 1
Intergenerational Mobility across Countries
Financial mobility Expected mobility
 upward stable downward upward stable downward
Austria 0.23 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.50 0.11
czech republic 0.32 0.38 0.30 0.48 0.43 0.10
Denmark 0.27 0.40 0.33 0.41 0.50 0.10
Germany 0.24 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.15
Greece 0.10 0.27 0.63 0.32 0.34 0.34
Hungary 0.25 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.49 0.05
Italy 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.30
Spain 0.30 0.41 0.30 0.38 0.36 0.26
Switzerland 0.25 0.49 0.26 0.42 0.46 0.12
turkey 0.42 0.42 0.16 0.61 0.32 0.07
united kingdom 0.24 0.41 0.35 0.41 0.40 0.19
NOte: Poststratification weights used in calculations.
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not clearly distinguishable, as shown by the somewhat overlapping confidence 
intervals of the lighter lines.
controlling for other status position factors such as receiving benefits oneself 
or being currently unemployed, mobility effects for financial and expected mobil­
ity also hold when included simultaneously in model 3. Again, the mobility effects 
support the self­interest argument underlying hypotheses H1 and H2, while we 
find no support for the competing arguments regarding deservingness. the fact 
that both mobility effects remain stable when included simultaneously also speaks 
in favor of distinct mechanisms that influence the young people’s attitudes.
Models 4 to 6 are similar to models 1 to 3, but focus on our second outcome “It’s 
humiliating to receive money without having to work.” Model 4, which includes 
financial mobility, but not expected mobility, does not show statistically significant 
mobility effects. though speculative, the signs of the mobility coefficients may, 
however, suggest a mechanism beyond self­interest, as captured by H3. We do 
however find statistically significant effects for upward mobility expectations in 
model 5, again suggesting that self­interest rather than identification with one’s 
social origin is determining welfare support attitudes. When included simultane­
ously, these results hold, i.e., controlling for the effects of financial upward mobility 
expectations are significantly related to negative views of receiving social support.
fIGure 1
Predicted Probability Plot
NOte: Predicted probabilities correspond to model 1 for financial mobility and to model 2 for 
expected mobility (table 2). Lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities of the two types of mobility for 
models 4 and 5, respectively. for financial mobility we can see a different 
pattern of agreement across mobility groups compared with figure 1, though 
mobility effects are not statistically significant in this case (see also model 4 
in table 2): downwardly mobile people express a lower likelihood of disagree­
ing that it is humiliating to receive money without having to work compared 
with both stable and upwardly mobile respondents. for expected mobility, 
mobility effects show a pattern similar to outcome 1, with upward mobility 
expectations decreasing the likelihood of disagreeing that it is humiliating to 
receive money without having to work. Visible by the nonoverlapping confi­
dence intervals with the remaining mobility effects, this effect is statistically 
significant.
Overall, our results support the assumption, ceteris paribus, that self­interest 
is a decisive driver of welfare state support, both in terms of experienced mobility 
and future mobility expectations. In that regard, intergenerational mobility 
apparently does not differ from the well­established social status effects per se. 
the empathy or identification with one’s former social origin group is thus less 
influential than hypothesized earlier.
fIGure 2
Predicted Probability Plot
NOte: Predicted probabilities correspond to model 4 for financial mobility and to model 5 for 
expected mobility (table 2). Lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Discussion and conclusion
We explore the impact of different types of intergenerational mobility—financial 
mobility and expected future mobility—on attitudes toward work and welfare. We 
drew on different strands of literature that remain contested in terms of the 
definitive effects an upward or downward shift in socioeconomic status and the 
role of factors beyond material self­interest for work­welfare attitudes. using a 
unique cross­national dataset, we examined how different dimensions of intergen­
erational mobility shape attitudes about the work­welfare nexus, finding that self­
interest, not empathy with one’s social origin, appears to be the driver of these 
attitudes, both in terms of experienced mobility and future mobility expectations. 
While these findings align with the seminal study of Benabou and Ok (2001), not 
only is the prospect of upward mobility shown to be a significant driver of work­
welfare attitudes, but downward mobility also matters: those who anticipate 
being worse off than their parents are less likely to hold negative views of welfare 
recipients than people who expect to do about the same or better. these results 
indicate that subjective perceptions may play a relatively larger role than the 
objective shifts along the income distribution compared with one’s parents 
(Bjornskov et al. 2013). this finding becomes all the more relevant when consid­
ering the very real prospects of downward mobility many young people face.
the findings regarding financial mobility generally indicate the presence of 
self­interest at work—that is, those who experienced upward mobility are more 
likely to agree with the statements “If welfare benefits are too high, then there is 
no incentive to work” and “It’s humiliating to receive money without having to 
work.” Our expectations in terms of empathy or identification with one’s status 
group of origin, however, do not appear to find empirical traction. rueda (2018) 
uses the concept of altruism to explain why material self­interest may not always 
explain preferences for redistribution, arguing that, when people identify with 
the less well off, in­group solidarity increases, so too does support for the welfare 
state. Investigating whether young people identify more with their status of ori­
gin or destination may help to elucidate our findings. Moreover, data sources that 
would allow the research to zoom in on the dimensions of the deservingness 
concept could also shed light on the mechanisms behind the relationships.
though the present study has made inroads into further disentangling the 
relationships between intergenerational mobility and work­welfare attitudes, 
further work remains. first, and as we hinted in this article, there are certainly 
important country differences to be considered. for example, young people in 
Southern europe faced a far more dire situation during and in the wake of the 
economic crisis that began to unfold in late 2007. Second, the risks of downward 
mobility are not equally distributed across countries nor individuals, as under­
scored by Moene and Wallerstein (2001). consequently, young people in certain 
countries or occupational groups may simply hold different expectations about 
the future due to these unequally distributed risks. therefore, future research is 
tasked with delving into these important country differences to provide a more 
complete picture of the varieties of intergenerational mobility and work­welfare 
attitudes.
152 tHe ANNALS Of tHe AMerIcAN AcADeMY
finally, we may be witnessing a shift in work and welfare attitudes reflecting 
the evolving nature of social and labor market policies. Many countries, as well 
as the european union, have adopted social and labor market policies that place 
a greater emphasis on individual responsibility. unemployment and training 
schemes, particularly those aimed at young people, are increasingly embodying 
concepts such as employability and responsibilization (crisp and Powell 2017), 
which stress the role and even duty of the individual to make him or herself 
attractive to employers and to end the dependency on state support. there are 
also important differences between the countries in terms of welfare systems—
including how benefits are allotted and administered—which also shape how the 
beneficiaries themselves are perceived. the findings from the current study 
perhaps imply that in countries with a higher incidence of downward mobility 
public support for unemployment programs will be higher. At the same time, this 
begs the question of who will fund such programs, as downward mobility is also 
most prevalent in countries that struggle the most economically.
Notes
1. respondents who indicated that their current primary activity is education or training were excluded 
from the analyses. Since they are still in the school­to­work transition, they constitute a very distinct group 
and may be quite difficult to compare to young people who are, for example, in full­time employment.
2. the financial situation is captured by the question “We (I) could (can) afford extras for ourselves 
(myself) (such as trips, hobbies, etc.).”
3. though political orientation is predictive of redistributive preferences (Jaeger 2008), its effect on the 
so­called moral dimensions of work and welfare is less clear. the inclusion of this variable could arguably 
be considered a particularly stringent test of the effects of mobility on work­welfare attitudes.
4. robustness tests using ordered logit models (not shown) and linear regression models (see online 
appendix table A4) revealed that mobility effects do not change substantively.
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